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The Washington State Supreme Court's decision in
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.' in July, 1984, was a landmark
decision in the area of employment at will law in Washington.
Prior to Thompson, Washington courts had followed the tradi-
tional American rule that a contract for employment of
unspecified duration was terminable at the will of either party
and that the employer could discharge the employee at any
time for any reason.2 Thus, an employee who was not given an
express promise of employment for a fixed period of time was
considered to be employed at will, and could not maintain an
action for wrongful discharge against his employer except in
very limited circumstances.3
While the Thompson court did not abandon the at will
rule entirely, it established two new exceptions under which
an at will employee could recover damages from a former
employer. These exceptions are based upon the employer's
conduct in terminating the employment relationship or upon
the reasons behind the decision to terminate. The first excep-
tion allows the employee to bring a breach of contract claim
based upon provisions contained in an employee policy manual
or handbook limitating the employer's right to discharge.4 The
second allows the employee to recover in tort if the discharge
contravenes a clearly mandated public policy.5
By abandoning the rule insulating employers from liability
for the discharge of an at will employee, Washington joined a
growing number of states that have formulated exceptions to
* Richard Wall is an attorney with the Washington State Attorney General's
Office. He received his J.D., cum laude, from the University of Puget Sound in 1986.
1. 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
2. See Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash. 2d 887, 891, 568 P.2d 764, 767 (1977).
3. See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
4. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088.
5. Id. at 232, 685 P.2d at 1089.
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the traditional at will employment doctrine in order to allevi-
ate some of its perceived harshness and unfairness to the
employee.' Prior to Thompson, many jurisdictions already had
adopted some form of tort-based public policy exceptions to the
at will rule.7 Contract-based exceptions were less widely rec-
ognized and more controversial.' By adopting both contract
and tort exceptions to the at will rule in a single opinion, the
Thompson court appeared to signal a new, more favorable judi-
cial attitude toward protecting the rights of Washington at will
employees from unfair termination.
At the same time, the Thompson opinion no doubt caused
considerable concern among employers in Washington. Read
6. See Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 MiCH. I.
L. REF. 277 (1983); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust DismissaL Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1816 (1980).
7. At the time Thompson was decided, the following jurisdictions had adopted an
exception to the at will rule based upon public policy: Tameny v. ARCO, 27 Cal. 3d
167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179
Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d
625 (1982); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrig. Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Palmateer
v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Frampton v.
Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Adler v. American Standard
Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245
N.W.2d 151 (1976); Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980); Cloutier v.
Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536
P.2d 512 (1975); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978); Brockmeyer v. Dun
& Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
8. See, e.g., Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335
(1975). The Thompson court also noted that several jurisdictions, including California,
had also recognized a "bad faith" exception to the at will rule by implying into every
employment contract an obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The court expressly
rejected the "bad faith" exception on the ground that it would subject every employee
discharge to judicial review under an "amorphous" standard and would unecessarily
intrude upon the employer's interest in managing his business. Thompson, 102 Wash.
2d at 227, 685 P.2d at 1086.
Several commentators have suggested that the problems arising from the at will
status of non-union employees should be dealt with through legislation. See, e.g.,
Comment, Employment At Will" Just Cause Protection Through Mandatory
Arbitration, 62 WASH. L. REv. 151 (1987); Comment, Unjust Discharge: Why Non-
Union Employees Need a Just Cause Statute, 25 WILAmEr L. REV. 135 (1989). A
thorough discussion of the merits of such proposals is beyond the scope of this article.
It is worth noting, however, that legislative attempts to establish a "just cause"
standard for dismissal or special arbitration procedures would face a number of
substantive and procedural difficulties. See Grodin, Past Presen and Future in
Wrongful Termination Law, 6 THE LABOR LAWYER 97, 103-06 (1990) for a discussion of
the problems that would be encountered in attempting to arbitrate wrongful
termination claims under a just cause standard.
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broadly, Thompson raised the specter of civil liability in almost
every employee termination, no matter how necessary or justi-
fied. In particular, the implied contract exception, while nomi-
nally applicable only to statements made in an employee
handbook, provided a theoretical justification for making any
communication between an employer and its employees a pos-
sible basis for a wrongful termination claim.
Thompson also left unanswered important questions with
respect to both the procedural and substantive aspects of the at
will employee's newly found rights. The Thompson opinion
failed to clearly define the jury's role in determining whether
an employee handbook or manual modified the at will relation-
ship by providing protection from dismissal under certain cir-
cumstances. The opinion left in doubt the proper allocation of
the burden of proof as to the reason for a dismissal and the
scope of protection afforded employees against erroneous
employer termination decisions. The decision also did not
address whether circumstances outside the language of the
handbook or manual could be taken into account in determin-
ing whether the handbook created specific obligations limiting
the employer's power to discharge its employees. As illus-
trated by recent appellate court cases, these questions are only
now being fully addressed. How those questions are resolved
could significantly affect the balance of the rights between
Washington employers and their at will employees.
At present, there is no clear indication from the courts as
to which way the tide will ultimately turn. While the general
trend has been to apply the Thompson exceptions narrowly,
several recent cases indicate the possibility of a more expansive
application of the principles established in Thompson. The
purpose of this Article is to examine the nature and origin of
the issues now being faced by Washington courts in the area of
at will employment and to argue that the well-established legal
principles governing other kinds of contracts be consistently
applied to at will employment contracts. This will result in a
proper balance between the desire to protect at will employees
from unfair termination and the need to allow employers the
freedom to make decisions in the hiring and termination of at
will employees without undue interference.
This Article will first review the historical development of
the at will rule from English common law through the signifi-
cant Washington state cases leading up to the Thompson deci-
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sion. Next, the Thompson case will be analyzed with particular
emphasis on the employee handbook exception to the at will
rule. The Article will then discuss cases decided after Thomp-
son and the manner in which the courts have attempted to
resolve some of the questions raised by the Thompson opinion.
The probable effects of an expansive interpretation of the
Thompson handbook exception on employer-employee rela-
tions will be considered in light of the actions employers may
take to avoid liability and exposure to Thompson-type claims
by discharged employees. Finally, the Article will argue that
the consistent adherence to established contract law principals
in the application of Thompson will benefit both employers
and employees by providing adequate protection against unjust
dismissal of at will employees while, at the same time, enhanc-
ing the ability of employers to communicate with their at will
employees.
I. HISTORY OF THE AT WILL RULE
Under traditional English common law, a hiring was pre-
sumed to be for one full year.9 This rule was founded on the
needs of an agrarian society and a recognition of a personal
obligation of the master to care for his servants, who were obli-
gated in turn to remain with the master throughout the four
seasons.10 This system ensured that the master would not lose
his labor force during the harvest season when it was needed
the most and that the servant would not be dismissed during
the winter or other periods of decreased activity." Toward the
end of the 19th Century, however, the emergence of a greater
variety of employment situations caused the English courts
gradually to relinquish the presumption of a yearly hiring and
adopt a rule that service contracts could be terminated upon
reasonable notice.' 2
Early American courts relied heavily on English prece-
dents.'3 Instead of following the reasonable notice rule, how-
ever, American jurisdictions developed three competing
approaches to deal with indefinite hirings.14 One approach pre-
9. Feinman, The Development of the Employee At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIsT. 118, 120 (1976).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 121.
13. Id. at 122.
14. Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335, 341 (1975).
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sumed that a hiring continued for the period of time fixed for
payment. Another approach treated the intended length of an
employment contract as a question of fact to be determined in
each case without the aid of a presumption.'" The third
approach presumed that an indefinite hiring was terminable at
the will of either party. That presumption, which became
known as Wood's rule after treatise writer Horace J. Wood,
eventually won out.
In his treatise on master/servant relations, Wood stated
the rule as follows:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite
hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks
to make out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to estab-
lish it by proof. 6
With the coming of the Industrial Age, a number of Amer-
ican courts began applying the at will presumption systemati-
cally and rigorously to employment contracts. 7 Facilitated by
the concepts of laissez-faire economics and by the formalist
ideology that guided the early development of contract law in
America,' the at will rule was soon transformed into a right of
the employer to discharge an employee of indefinite hiring at
any time for any reason, even for a cause morally wrong, with-
out at the same time being guilty of a legal wrong.'9 While
even this harsh formulation of the at will rule would appear to
15. See, e.g., Smith v. Theobald, 86 Ky. 141, 5 S.W. 394 (1887); Bascom v. Shillito, 37
Ohio St. 431 (1882).
16. H. WOOD, MAsTER AND SERvANT § 134 (2nd ed. 1887). Most commentators
criticize Wood's formulation of the rule as not being supported by the cited cases. See
Feinman, supra note 9, at 126; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 335, 351 (1975). At least one commentator, however, has argued that Wood's
rule was a correct reflection of the law and that subsequent cases attributed to him a
stricter rule than he actually espoused. Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon The
Presumption That Employment Is Terminable At Will, 23 IDAHo L. REV. 219, 222
(1986). That view appears to have some merit because Wood's treatise stated only that
an indefinite hiring was presumed to be terminable at will. Thus, the presumption in
theory could be overcome by any competent evidence showing that the parties had
some other intent.
17. See, e.g., Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908);
Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 17 Del. 581, 43 A. 609 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Martin v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
18. Blades, Employment At Will v& Individual Freedom- On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
19. See Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915); see also Fawcett v.
G.C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St. 2d 245, 348 N.E.2d 144 (1976) for a more recent
formulation of the rule in its absolute form. In Fawcett, the court held that the
employer's right to terminate is absolute and not limited by principles that protect
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leave open the possibility of implied contractual modification,
in practice the employee without a written contract of employ-
ment for a definite period of time was precluded from making
any factual showing upon which implied contract rights might
be based.2"
This abdication of judicial oversight of the employment
relation reached its peak in two Supreme Court cases, Adair v.
United States"1 and Coppage v. Kansas.' In each case, the
United States Supreme Court held that legislative attempts to
regulate employment contracts violated the employer's funda-
mental right to discharge its employees. Adair and Coppage
have subsequently been repudiated by the Supreme Court, and
as the court in Thompson noted, the employer's prerogative to
discharge at will employees has been significantly limited in
recent years by both federal and state legislation.' Neverthe-
less, the at will rule remains in force to some extent in most
states, and subject only to specific limitations imposed by stat-
ute or court rule, an employer may still terminate an at will
employee for no cause or for any cause, even a cause which
may appear morally wrong.
II. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL IN WASHINGTON
In early Washington cases in which employment contracts
were at issue, the Washington Supreme Court followed the
prevailing American rule that employment contracts for an
indefinite term were terminable at will unless the employee
gave additional consideration beyond the services rendered.'
The additional consideration had to be something that the par-
ties had not contemplated at the time of employment. For
example, in Heideman v. Tall's Travel Shops, Inc.,' the Wash-
ington Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that
leaving his former job to take up employment with the defend-
ant was sufficient consideration to support the defendant's
persons from gross or reckless conduct, willful or malicious acts, or acts done with
insult or in bad faith.
20. See Feinman, supra note 9, at 129.
21. 208 U.S. 161 (1890) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute preventing
common carriers from firing employees for union membership).
22. 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (holding unconstitutional a state statute forbidding contracts
requiring employees to agree not to join a union).
23. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 226, 685 P.2d at 1085-86.
24. Grensman v. West Coast Power Co., 3 Wash. 2d 404, 101 P.2d 316 (1940);
Heideman v. Tall's Travel Shops, Inc., 192 Wash. 513, 73 P.2d 1323 (1937).
25. 192 Wash. 513, 73 P.2d 1323 (1937).
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promise of lifetime employment.'
In later cases, the court appeared to adopt a more flexible
approach, holding that the question of whether an employment
was for a fixed or an indefinite period of time must be deter-
mined by the circumstances of each case.2 In theory, this
allowed the employee to show implied contract rights to job
security by introducing evidence that his employment was for
a fixed period of time, and therefore not at will. However, an
employee who had. not been given express assurances that his
employment would last for a specific period of time faced a dif-
ficult task in establishing such implied contract rights.'
The first indication that the Washington Supreme Court
might be willing to reconsider its position on the terminable-
at-will doctrine came in 1977 in Roberts v. ARCO. 29 In Roberts,
the employee alleged that he had been discriminated against
because of his age, that the circumstances of his employment
created an implied condition that he would not be terminated
in bad faith, and that he could be terminated only for just
cause.' The Roberts court characterized the employee's claim
of implied contract rights as involving two distinct issues: (1)
whether there was an implied agreement that the employee
would be terminated only for just cause; and (2) whether the
employee had, in addition to the contemplated services, given
consideration which would limit his employer's right to termi-
nate at will. 31
The Roberts court first held that the employee had only a
subjective understanding or expectation that he would be dis-
charged only for just cause, and that such an understanding or
expectation was insufficient to support a finding of an implied
agreement.32 The court also held that the fact that the
employee had foregone another job opportunity when he was
first employed by ARCO and had moved his family four times
during his employment with ARCO did not amount to
26. Id. at 518, 72 P.2d at 1325.
27. Lasser v. Grumbaum Bros. Furniture Co., Inc., 46 Wash. 2d 408, 281 P.2d 832
(1955).
28. Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 674 (1977); Webster v. Schauble,
65 Wash. 2d 849, 400 P.2d 292 (1965).
29. 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 674 (1977).
30. Id. at 889, 568 P.2d at 766.
31. Id. at 894, 568 P.2d at 768-69.
32. Id. at 895, 568 P.2d at 769.
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independent consideration in addition to expected services."
Finally, the Roberts court noted that several other jurisdictions
had carved out some limited exceptions to the terminable-at-
will rule, but concluded that although "the future of [the at
will] doctrine is a compelling issue, it is one that must be left
for another day and different facts."34
In 1982, the Washington Court of Appeals was presented
with an opportunity to modify Washington's terminable-at-will
doctrine in the case of Parker v. United Air Lines, Inc.s In
Parker, United Airlines had fired an employee who had been
with the company for 12 years for allegedly retaining payments
intended for United Airlines and for misusing her travel pass
privileges.36 After two unsuccessful attempts to challenge her
termination through the company's internal grievance proce-
dures, the employee sued for wrongful discharge. The trial
court dismissed the suit on summary judgment.37
On appeal, the employee argued that statements made to
her at an employee orientation session and on certain employ-
ment forms created an implied contractual right to continued
employment absent just cause for termination.' These state-
ments did not specifically provide that the employee would be
terminated only for cause, but indicated that, upon completion
of a probationary period, the employee would be entitled to a
determination that there was cause for any dismissal and could
appeal any disciplinary action to a higher official within the
company.' In addition, United's employee manual contained a
statement that an employee could be terminated for just cause
or for economic reasons.4° The employee argued that these




The court of appeals rejected these arguments and, citing
Roberts, held that the employee had only a subjective under-
standing that she would be terminated only for just cause and
that this subjective understanding was insufficient to defeat
33. Id. at 896, 568 P.2d at 769 (citing Heideman v. Tall's Travel Shops, Inc., 192
Wash. 513, 73 P.2d 1323).
34. Id. at 898, 568 P.2d at 770.
35. Parker v. United Air Lines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982).
36. Id. at 723, 649 P.2d at 182.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 724, 649 P.2d at 182.
39. Id. at 724-25, 649 P.2d at 182-83.
40. Id. at 725, 649 P.2d at 183.
41. Id.
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the at will status of her employment.'2 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court of appeals, by implication, determined that a
reasonable person would not have interpreted the statements
made by United as being a promise of continued employment.
That determination appears correct in that the statements
made by United seemed to promise only that certain proce-
dures would be followed in any termination. Parker did not
specifically allege that she had been denied any such proce-
dural rights and, indeed, did not file suit against United until
the available grievance procedure had been concluded. The
Washington Supreme Court refused to review the court of
appeals' decision. As a result, the at will rule remained intact
until the Thompson decision 3 years later.
III. THOMPSON V. ST. REGIS PAPER CO.
In 1984, Kenneth L. Thompson brought his appeal before
the Washington Supreme Court after his wrongful discharge
claim had been dismissed by the superior court on summary
judgment. Thompson, a Divisional Controller for St. Regis
Paper Co., had been asked to resign after 17 years of service
with the company. During those 17 years, St. Regis had pro-
moted Thompson several times and had awarded him regular
bonuses under the company's management incentive compen-
sation plan. The day following the request for his resignation,
in fact, Thompson was awarded an additional $10,000.00 bonus
for his last year's performance. He was also awarded sever-
ance pay in accordance with a section in the company's policy
and procedures guide, which stated that all employee termina-
tions would be "processed in a manner which will at all times
be fair, reasonable and just. '43 According to Thompson, the
only explanation given to him for his termination was that he
"had stepped on somebody's toes."44
Thompson alleged that St. Regis had acted "dishonestly"
and without "good faith" and had demanded his resignation in
retaliation for his having instituted certain accounting proce-
dures in compliance with a federal anti-bribery statute, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.4' Thompson also
42. Id.
43. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 222, 685 P.2d 1081, 1084
(1984).
44. Id. at 221, 685 P.2d at 1083.
45. Id.
1990]
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argued that the provisions of the policy and procedures guide,
coupled with his good employment record, created an implied
contract that he would be terminated only for just cause.4
In dismissing the suit, the trial court held that Thompson's
employment was terminable at will and that no implied con-
tract existed to limit St. Regis's power of termination. The
court reasoned that St. Regis's stated policies of fair treatment,
and its requirement of a probationary period and review prior
to termination did not create an implied contract that Thomp-
son was subject to termination only for just cause. Having
determined that Thompson could be terminated at any time
for any reason, the trial court also denied Thompson's motion
to compel St. Regis to answer interrogatories concerning the
reason for his termination.47 The Washington Supreme Court
granted direct review.
In the first sentence of the opinion, Justice Brachtenbach
summarized the supreme court's view of the case: "Does a ter-
minable-at-will employee have a cause of action for wrongful
discharge when his employer summarily discharges him and
gives no reason for so doing?"'  The answer the court had in
mind is clear from the manner in which it phrased the issue.
The difficulty for the court, however, was reaching the desired
result without completely abandoning the terminable-at-will
rule to which that it had consistently adhered in the past.
The court chose to adopt two narrowly tailored exceptions
to the at will rule-one based upon tort principles and the
other upon implied contract principles. The tort-based excep-
tion provides that an employer may be liable for discharging an
at will employee if the reason for the discharge contravenes
some clearly defined public policy. The most obvious example
of this type of discharge is the firing of an employee because
the employee refuses to engage in some illegal conduct on
behalf of the employer.49 This exception has been widely rec-
ognized and does not appear to impose an unreasonable burden
on employers if the concept of public policy is clearly defined.
46. Id. at 222, 685 P.2d at 1084.
47. Id. at 223, 685 P.2d at 1084.
48. Id. at 221, 685 P.2d at 1084.
49. See, e.g., Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978)
(bank employee discharged for attempting to require employer's compliance with state
consumer protection laws). Nearly every jurisdiction to have considered the issue has
adopted some form of public policy exception to the employment-at will rule. See
supra note 7.
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If the public policy is easily ascertainable, employers can deter-
mine when a termination or other discharge may result in lia-
bility and conduct themselves accordingly.' Recognizing this
need to define public policy narrowly, the court in Thompson
limited the scope of the exception to clear violations of policy
specifically identified by a valid statute, regulation or pub-
lished court decision.51
In devising an implied contract exception to the at will
rule, the Washington Supreme Court relied heavily on Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield,52 a Michigan Supreme
Court opinion which was one of the first cases to recognize the
"employee handbook" exception. In Toussaint, the employee
policy manual in question stated that the employer's intention
was "'[t]o provide for the administration of fair, consistent and
reasonable corrective discipline'" and "'to treat employees
leaving Blue Cross in a fair and consistent manner and to
release employees for just cause only.' "" The court held that
these statements of company policy were sufficient to create
legally enforceable obligations on the part of the employer.'
The court justified its holding by asserting that:
[Where an employer chooses to establish such policies
and practices and makes them known to its employees, the
employment relationship is presumably enhanced.... It is
enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own
interest, to create an environment in which the employee
believes that, whatever the personnel policies and practices,
they are established and official at any given time, purport
to be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each
employee. The employer has then created a situation
"instinct with an obligation."
' 5
50. A good example of the limitations of the Thompson public policy exception is
found in Trumbauer v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 635 F. Supp. 543
(W.D. Wash. 1986). In Trumbauer, the plaintiff was dismissed because is relationship
with his supervisor violated the employer's "anti-nepotism" policy. The plaintiff
claimed that his dismissal violated public policy because it infringed upon his freedom
of association and right to privacy under the Washington State Constitution. The
District Court dismissed the claim, however, because it did not find any legislatively or
judicially recognized public policy against discrimination based upon social
relationships. Id. at 549.
51. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d 219, 232, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089.
52. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
53. Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 617, 292 N.W. 2d at 893.
54. Id. at 618-19, 292 N.W.2d at 894.
55. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
1990]
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The Toussaint analysis ignores the traditional contract
requirements of consideration and bargained-for exchange.
Apparently, the employee need not even be aware of the spe-
cific provisions of a policy manual in order to have those provi-
sions enforced against the employer. Nor is the employee
required to give any additional consideration to make the
employer's unilateral statement binding. The result appears to
rest more upon general equitable considerations than on tradi-
tional contract law. Failure to enforce such provisions would
be "unfair" since the employer would supposedly obtain the
benefit of "an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force" while
giving up nothing in return. Thus, the employer may not treat
its "promise" as meaningless.'
While adopting much of the Toussaint reasoning, the
Washington Supreme Court took a slightly different analytical
approach. Although the court noted that employers expect
and intend certain statements in their employee handbooks to
have a beneficial effect upon the employment relationship, the
court did not find this fact alone to be a sufficient basis for
finding an implied contract. Instead, the court focused on the
individual employee and whether or not the employee had jus-
tifiably relied on an express promise in the employee hand-
book of "specific treatment in specific situations. ''57
While the court did not cite § 90 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, its emphasis on specific representations in
the employee handbook upon which the employee might rely
by remaining on the job and not actively seeking other employ-
ment suggests that the Thompson handbook exception is actu-
ally based upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel. That
doctrine has two principal parts. First, the promisor is bound
only by those promises which he does or should reasonably
expect others to rely upon, and second, enforcement of the
promise must be necessary to avoid injustice.' Thus, a legal
obligation will arise when the following elements are present:
(1) a promise;
(2) which the promisor reasonably expects will induce
action or forebearance in reliance by the promisee or third
party;
(3) actual reliance by the promisee or third party; and
56. Id.
57. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90, comment a. (1981).
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(4) injustice if the promise is not enforced.59
The concept of promissory estoppel probably does not
accurately describe what typically happens when an employer
distributes an employee handbook to his employees. While the
employer may seek to establish general guidelines applicable
to its employees as a group, it seems unlikely that the
employer expects or intends to make any specific commitment
to treat individual employees in any particular manner. In
many cases, the primary intent of the employer is to communi-
cate to the employees what is expected of them. Nor is it
likely that the employer expects any individual employee to
interpret statements regarding how the employer intends to
treat the workforce as a whole as an express promise limiting
the employer's future conduct in a particular case, especially
where the language is general rather than specific. Moreover,
employee manuals are usually subject to unilateral modifica-
tion or withdrawal by the employer.60
In addition, the idea that an employee might rely upon a
particular provision in an employee handbook by remaining on
the job and not seeking other employment implies that, but for
the inclusion of that provision, the employee would have quit
his job or would have actively sought another job. However,
where an employee is otherwise satisfied with the conditions of
employment, it seems doubtful that he or she would in fact
quit or seek other work because of the absence of written ter-
mination policies or guidelines. It is more likely that any
thoughtful consideration by the employee of statements
regarding termination policies does not ordinarily occur until
after the employee has been discharged or threatened with
discharge.
These conceptual difficulties with the application of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel to at will employment are con-
siderably lessened, however, if the handbook contains state-
ments that the employer will engage in or refrain from certain
specified conduct with regard to terminating individual
employees. Where an employer uses such language in an
employment handbook, it appears that the employer in fact
intends to make a commitment to each individual employee
and that the employee upon reading the statement could rea-
sonably believe that he or she could rely on such a commit-
59. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 90.
60. See Larson, supra note 16, at 232.
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ment, until it is withdrawn by the employer. Such a statement
of specific future conduct by the employer, as opposed to gen-
eral statements of "fair treatment" for all employees, would
thus be more likely to influence a particular employee to
forego other employment opportunities and to remain on the
job.
However, it is relatively easy for a dismissed employee to
claim such reliance, and whether justified reliance occurred
will ordinarily be a question of fact to be resolved by a jury.
That determination is likely to be guided by general considera-
tions of fairness because most juries will not readily grasp the
legal distinction between a broad statement of intent to treat
employees fairly and a more narrow promise of specific treat-
ment in specific situations. In addition, sympathy for the ter-
minated employee may cause juries to read more into broad
policy statements than the language itself justifies. Thus,
there may be little practical difference at the trial stage
between the broad equitable approach used by the court in
Toussaint and the more narrow implied contract analysis
employed by the court in Thompson.
Nevertheless, the differences between these two analytical
methods may be significant at the pre-trial stage of litigation.
Whereas, under Toussaint the employee need not even be
aware of a particular policy provision in an employee hand-
book, an employee bringing an action based upon Thompson
must be able to allege that he had read the specific provision
relied upon or was otherwise aware of its existence.61 Absent
such knowledge, the employee cannot claim to have "justifia-
bly relied" on the employer's promise. Furthermore, the
employee must establish that the statements relied upon con-
stituted a promise of "specific treatment." A promise is
defined by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as "a mani-
festation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified
way, so made as to justify a promise in understanding a com-
mitment has been made."62 Where there is no dispute as to the
language employed, the court should determine as a matter of
law whether a particular statement, or series of statements, is
capable of being construed as a promise. 63 Therefore, a plain-
61. Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Co., 111 Wash. 2d 609, 614, 762 P.2d 1143, 1146
(1988).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981).
63. Messerly v. Asamera Minerals (U.S.), Inc., 55 Wash. App. 811, 816, 780 P.2d
1327, 1330 (1989) (citing Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Co., 111 Wash. 2d 609, 613, 762
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tiff under Thompson may be prevented from presenting his or
her claim to a jury if the court concludes that the statement
relied upon did not amount to a promise. Thompson provides,
in effect, a method by which the court can cut short a claim
that is not well founded.
Unfortunately, the Thompson opinion did not clearly state
whether the court or the jury has responsibility for making the
initial determination that a particular statement in a handbook
constitutes a promise. The court stated only that the question
of whether any statements contained in Thompson's employee
handbook amounted to promises of specific treatment in spe-
cific situations presented a material issue of fact. 4 On the sur-
face, this statement would appear to allow a jury to peruse an
entire handbook or manual for any language that it believes
constitutes such a promise and thus, places employers at the
mercy of juries who arguably will tend to favor the employee.6
P.2d 1143, 1146 (1988)); see Yeager v. Dobbins, 252 N.C. 824, 114 S.E.2d 820 (1960) (in
which the court held that statements in a letter from a father to his son that he would
like for the son to take over the family farm if the son was willing to work it did not
constitute an offer to convey the farm to the son); Cederstrand v. Lutheran
Brotherhood, 263 Minn. 520, 117 N.W.2d 213, (1962) (in which the court held that a
statement in an employee handbook that a "person is not discharged without cause,
and it is customary to give a warning and and opportunity to 'make good' before final
dismissal" did not amount to a promise of dismissal for just cause only). But see
Granfield v. Catholic University of America, 530 F.2d 1035, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1976) in
which the appellate court treated the trial court's determination that "amorphous"
statements regarding the University's aims to achieve salary "parity" did not constitute
a promise.
64. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 233, 685 P.2d at 1089. Several Washington cases are
in direct conflict over this issue. Adler v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 53 Wash. App. 33,
765 P.2d 910 (1988), review denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1013 (1989) and Brady v. Daily World,
105 Wash. 2d 770, 718 P.2d 785 (1986) indicate that whether a promise has been made is
a- question of fact to be determined by the jury along with whether the promise has
been justifiably relied upon by the employee. Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Co., 111
Wash. 2d 609, 762 P.2d 1143 (1988), Messerly v. Asamera Minerals (U.S.), Inc., 55 Wash.
App. 811, 780 P.2d 1327 (1989), and Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 55 Wash. App. 917,
781 P.2d 900 (1989) indicate that whether a promise has been made is a question of law
for the Court, while the question of reliance is one for the jury. The latter cases are
the better reasoned in that they more clearly distinguish the employer's act of making
a promise from the employee's act of relying on that promise. See 1 A. CORBIN, 1
CORBIN ON CoNTRaAcrS § 13 (Supp. 1990) (approving the methodology employed in
Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Co. as consistent with the general rule that
"construction" of a contract raises a question of law while "interpretation" of the
language may involve a factual inquiry to determine the meaning of vague or
ambiguous terms).
65. See Lopatla, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial
Assessment of the Labor Law of the 80's, 40 Bus. LAwYER 1, 4 (November 1984). The
idea that juries tend to favor employees in wrongful termination suits is not without
some statistical support. For example, in 120 jury trials of wrongful termination suits
86 University of Puget Sound Law Review
While no court has yet gone that far, some have allowed the
jury to decide whether the employer has made a promise to its
employees where the language of the handbook does not
clearly manifest an intention to act or refrain from acting in a
specified manner.'
At least one court, Leikvold v. Valley View Community
Hosp.,67 has specifically held that the question of whether a
statement contained in an employee handbook is a promise is
one of law when the language employed is clear and unambig-
uous, but becomes one of fact to be resolved by the jury when
the language is ambiguous.' While this approach has been rec-
ommended by some commentators, it is inconsistent with gen-
eral principals of contract interpretation. As a general rule,
any ambiguity in the language of a contract will be construed
against the person who drafted the contract. Thus, if a hand-
book contains a statement that is ambiguous but is nonetheless
capable of being construed as a promise by the employee, then
it should be construed against the employer who drafted the
handbook. If the statement is ambiguous but not capable of
being reasonably construed as a promise to the employee, then
no obligation arises. Either way, there is no need to have a
jury "interpret" ambiguous language. In essence, the two step
approach used in Leikvold begs the initial question of whether
a promise of any kind has been made but then allows the jury
to determine what was supposedly promised.
It has been suggested that Washington should adopt the
Leikvold approach because jurors are better qualified to deter-
mine a layperson's understanding of handbook language than
are judges who are educated in legal terminology.69 Even if
that assumption is true, it is irrelevant. Under general con-
tract principles, a statement that is made outside the context of
a bargained-for exchange becomes binding on the person mak-
in California between 1980 and 1986, 81 (67.5%) resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff.
J. DERTOUZOS, E. HOLLAND, P. EBENER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WRONGFUL TERMINATION (1988) pp. 19-26.
66. See, e.g., Siekawitch v. Washington Beef Producers, Inc., 58 Wash. App. 454,
793 P.2d 994 (1990) (in which language in the employee handbook was susceptible to
differing interpretations and the evidence conflicted as to which interpretation was
intended; therefore, it was a question for the jury whether the employee justifiably
relied on a promise of specific treatment in specific situations).
67. 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 785 (1986).
68. Id.
69. See Note, The Personnel Manual Exception to Employment-At-Wilk Is Job
Security Merely an Illusion?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 997, 1007 (1989).
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ing the statement only if that person expects or reasonably
should expect that persons hearing the statement will believe
that a commitment is being made and will rely upon the state-
ment in some manner.70 Thus, the jury's or the employee's
subjective understanding of a particular statement cannot, and
should not, by itself, make the statement binding on the
employer, a statement that may have been made without any
reasonable expectation that the employee would think a prom-
ise was being made.
The correct approach is to allow the court to make the ini-
tial determination as to whether any statement made by the
employer constitutes a promise expected to induce reliance.7 '
The handbook will usually be part of the evidence at trial, so
there will be no factual dispute about what was actually stated.
The court, having experience in applying the objective "reason-
able person" standard in other contexts, is probably in a better
position to make a proper determination as to whether a state-
ment has sufficient manifestation of intent to justify an
employee's understanding that a commitment has been made
by the employer.
In addition, the employer will not be subject to varied
interpretations of the same language by different juries.
Under the Leikvold approach, a jury in one case could deter-
mine that a statement constituted a promise intended or
expected to induce reliance, while a jury in another case could
determine that the same statement made in the same or simi-
lar circumstances did not constitute a promise. The resulting
uncertainty would severely limit the ability of employers to
communicate in writing with their employees without risking
liability. Conversely, a determination as a matter of law by an
appellate court that a particular type of statement could or
could not be reasonably construed as a promise of specific
treatment in a specific situation would have precedential sig-
nificance and would bring greater stability and predictability to
employer-employee communication within the at will
relationship.
IV. HANDBOOK DIsCLAIMERS
Another issue that has caused considerable confusion
70. See, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CONTRACS § § 2 and 90 (1981).
71. See Messerly v. Asamera Minerals (U.S.), Inc., 55 Wash. App. 811, 816, 780 P.2d
1327, 1330 (1989).
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among the courts is the use of disclaimers by employers to
avoid liability under Thompson. The court in Thompson spe-
cifically stated that a properly worded and conspicuously
placed disclaimer could prevent statements in an employee
handbook from resulting in any unintended modification of an
employee's at will status.72 Apparently, the court felt that
such a disclaimer would preclude an employee from justifiably
relying on a statement contained in the handbook, even though
the statement could be regarded as a promise of specific treat-
ment in specific situations.
Language stating that the employee remains dischargeable
at will despite other statements or representations by the
employer may be included in a written contract as well. The
Washington Supreme Court has held that parol evidence,
including statements in an employee handbook, cannot be used
to modify the parties' express agreement regarding the
employee's at will status.7 3 While the result may be the same
in many cases, the distinction between a disclaimer contained
in an employee manual and an express agreement that the
employee will remain terminable at will is crucial to a determi-
nation of whether the employee's at will status has been modi-
fied. The legal requirements for modifying an express
bargained-for contract are different from the legal require-
ments for establishing an implied contract based upon a unilat-
eral promise. Unfortunately, the courts have sometimes failed
to recognize the difference and, as a result, have given dis-
claimers greater effect than they deserve.
In Hibbert v. Centennial Villas, Inc.,7 for example, the
employee was given a handbook and an "optional grievance
procedure" following a two-week orientation. Both the hand-
book and grievance procedure contained statements that
employment remained terminable at will. The employee
signed an acknowledgment that she had read and understood
the employer's policies and would abide by them. She also
signed statements that the employer's personnel policies were
72. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 230-31, 685 P.2d at 1088.
73. St. Yves v. Mid State Bank, 111 Wash. 2d 374, 757 P.2d 1384 (1988). In St Yves,
the plaintiff had been employed as the president of a bank pursuant to a written
contract. One part of the contract stated that the term of the contract would be two
years. Another part of the contract stated that St. Yves could be terminated by the
bank at any time for any reason. The court refused to consider the provisions of the
personnel manual because it determined that the written contract was not ambiguous.
74. 56 Wash. App. 889, 786 P.2d 309 (1990).
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not to be interpreted as a promise of employment and that the
employer could unilaterally change or withdraw the policies at
any time.75 The employee brought an action for wrongful dis-
charge, claiming that the employee handbook created an
implied contract for just cause termination only and that she
had been terminated without cause. The court of appeals
upheld dismissal of the employee's claim, holding that the dis-
claimer language contained in the employee handbook and
later statements signed by the employee precluded, as a matter
of law, any claim of an implied contract.76
The Hibbert court cited St. Yves v. Mid State Bank77 as
support for its ruling. The St. Yves case, however, involved a
bargained-for contract between a bank and its president which
provided that the employee was terminable at will. In Hibbert,
on the other hand, the employee merely acknowledged state-
ments that were unilateral expressions by the employer. The
employee's signature was apparently a requirement of contin-
ued employment. Neither the language of the statements nor
the circumstances under which they were signed indicates that
the parties expressly agreed to any terms of employment.
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that St. Yves was control-
ling because "[t]o the extent the parties expressly agreed on
anything, they agreed that Hibbert's employment was termina-
ble at-will."7 8 The court's reasoning in Hibbert is problematic
because there was clearly no express "agreement" or "meeting
of the minds" between employer and employee regarding the
employee's at will status.79 In addition, the employee appar-
ently received no additional consideration for acknowledging
the employer's unilateral statement. Thus, unlike St. Yves, no
express contract was formed.
In Hibbert, the handbook upon which the employee claims
to have relied did not contain an explicit disclaimer. Such was
not the case, however, in Messerly v. Asamera Minerals (U.S.),
Inc.,8° where the court properly held that a disclaimer in an
employee handbook that had been distributed several years
after the employee was hired "preserved" the employee's at
75. Id. at 891, 786 P.2d at 310.
76. Id. at 892-93, 786 P.2d at 311.
77. 111 Wash. 2d 374, 757 P.2d 1384 (1988).
78. Hibbert, 56 Wash. App. at 892, 786 P.2d at 311.
79. Id. at 904-05, 786 P.2d at 318 (Ringold, J., dissenting).
80. 55 Wash. App. 811, 780 P.2d 1327 (1989).
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will status.8l The court in Messerly did not find that the dis-
claimer in the handbook was "conspicuous." It did hold, how-
ever, that the plaintiff could not claim to have been unaware of
the disclaimer because the disclaimer had been specifically
explained to him when the handbook was distributed to the
employees.8 2
As illustrated by Hibbert, St. Yves, and Messerly, there is a
significant difference between an express agreement that an
employee is discharageable at will and a disclaimer contained
in an application, employee handbook or other document uni-
laterally issued by the employer. An express contract may
only be modified when the parties manifest a mutual intent to
be bound and provide new consideration.' Under Thompson,
however, an employee's at will status can be modified without
any manifest meeting of the minds and without any additional
consideration flowing to the employer. A unilateral promise
and justified reliance is all that is required. Thus, while dis-
claimer language in an employee manual or handbook may,
under certain circumstances, prevent an employee from claim-
ing justifiable reliance on an employer's unilateral statements,
disclaimers should not be given the same effect as an express
agreement that an employee is terminable at will. In some
cases, it may be appropriate, despite a disclaimer, to allow the
jury to determine whether the employee did in fact rely on the
employer's promise where circumstances indicate that the
employee's reliance may have been justified (for example,
where the employer later makes specific promises in writing
that are not accompanied by a disclaimer or which directly
contradict previous disclaimer statements). In contrast, where
the employee has expressly agreed to remain terminable at the
will of the employer, the circumstances must show a mutual
intent to change the terms of the contract.
Unfortunately, the Washington State Supreme Court has
further confused this issue recently by remanding the case of
Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp.,84 for reconsideration in light of
the St. Yves decision. In Swanson, the employee was issued a
81. Id. at 816-17, 780 P.2d at 1330-31.
82. Id.
83. Rosellini v. Banduro, 83 Wash. 2d 268, 273, 517 P.2d 955, 958 (1974).
84. 55 Wash. App. 917, 781 P.2d 900 (1989), remanded, 114 Wash. 2d 1008, 788 P.2d
531, aff'd after remand sub nom, Swanson v. LeDuc, No. 115-40-9-I, 791 P.2d 257
(1990).
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handbook containing a disclaimer.8 Several years later, the
employee received several additional statements of company
policy which did not include any disclaimer language. The
court of appeals held that the disclaimer in the handbook did
not necessarily prevent the employee from justifiably relying
on the later statements. 6 The Washington Supreme Court
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of St. Yves with-
out explanation.
While the supreme court did not indicate the reason for its
remand order, the court apparently felt that the disclaimer in
the handbook issued to the employee in Swanson had the same
legal effect as the contract signed by the employee in St. Yves
and that the court of appeals erred by allowing the question of
the employee's reliance to be submitted to a jury. It is doubt-
ful, however, that the court of appeals and the parties in Swan-
son simply overlooked the St. Yves decision. A more logical
explanation is that the parties and the court recognized that St.
Yves has no application in the absence of an express contract
of employment. Indeed, the court of appeals confirmed this
assessment in its Order on Reconsideration adhering to its
original opinion. 8
In any event, there remains a direct conflict between Hib-
bert and Swanson as to whether an employer's unilateral state-
ment that an employee is terminable at will necessarily
prevents an employee from asserting an implied contract claim
for wrongful discharge under Thompson. The supreme court's
remand of Swanson seems to indicate that, for the present, the
court thinks that such statements do or should have such
preclusive effect.
Such a ruling would, as a practical matter, completely
undermine the handbook exception to the at will rule as set
forth in Thompson. Once the employer has included a general
disclaimer in a handbook, the employer could thereafter make
promises to its employees with impunity, because the employee
could not claim justifiable reliance on even the most explicit
promises. Even honest employers might unintentionally mis-
lead employees by paying less attention to the kinds of state-
ments included in handbooks and similar publications. Greater
85. Id. at 918, 781 P.2d at 901.
86. Id. at 922, 781 P.2d at 903.
87. Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 114 Wash. 2d 1008; see Hibbert v. Central Villas,
Inc., 56 Wash. App. 889, 906, 786 P.2d 309, 319 (1990) (Ringold, J., dissenting).
88. Swanson v. LeDuc, No. 11540-9-I, 791 P.2d 257 (1990).
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attention to the possible effects of such statements upon
employees should be encouraged rather than discouraged.
V. BURDEN OF PROOF
Another question raised by the Thompson decision is the
proper allocation of the burden of proof between employee and
employer. With respect to the public policy exception to the at
will rule, the court stated that once the employee had demon-
strated that his discharge may have been motivated by reasons
contrary to public policy, the burden would shift to the
employer to show that the reasons for dismissal were other
than that claimed by the employee.8 9 However, the court in
Thompson did not make clear whether the employer's burden
at that point was to simply produce some evidence of a proper
motive or to persuade the fact finder that such a motive was in
fact the reason for the employee's termination.
The court also did not discuss the allocation of the burden
of proof in the context of implied contract rights arising out of
an employee handbook. Presumably, the court expected that
an employee would be required to prove each element of his
claim in the same manner as any other party asserting a
breach of contract. That is, the employee would have to prove
that a specific promise of specific treatment was made by the
employer, that the employee relied on that promise by staying
on the job and not seeking other employment, and that the
employee was terminated in a manner contrary to the
employer's promise.'
In Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence,91 the Washington
Supreme Court set out the proper allocation of the burden of
proof under the implied contract exception of Thompson. At
the same time, the court clarified the standard for determining
whether the employer had complied with any promises to the
employee of specific treatment in specific situations. In Bald-
win, the employee manual at issue contained a provision for
"just cause" dismissal and set forth a four-step grievance proce-
dure for resolving employee complaints.92 The trial court
89. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 232-33, 685 P.2d 1081, 1089
(1984).
90. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d at 1088.
91. 112 Wash. 2d 127, 769 P.2d 298 (1989).
92. Id. at 129, 769 P.2d at 299.
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instructed the jury that the employer had the burden of prov-
ing that the employee had been dismissed for just cause.
The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court's
instruction was in error. The court ruled that once the
employee had made out a prima facie case of discrimination,
the employer was required only to articulate some legitimate
reason for the employee's dismissal.9 3 The ultimate burden of
persuasion, however, remained with the employee. 4 The court
reasoned that defendants in an action under Thompson should
not face a greater burden than they would face in statutory
actions for discrimination. 5 The court also reasoned that
requiring the employee to prove a breach of the employer's
implied promise would maintain a proper balance between the
employer's interest in running his business and the employee's
interest in continued employment.96
The trial court in Baldwin had also instructed the jury
that "just cause" meant that the employer had "a good, sub-
stantial and legitimate business reason" for discharging the
employee.9' The supreme court found this instruction to be
erroneous as well and held that, where an employer has con-
tractually bound himself to discharge an employee for just
cause only, the existence of just cause is a matter to be deter-
mined by the employer, in the exercise of good faith.9" Thus,
the jury should have been instructed that it could find in favor
of the plaintiff only if the decision to discharge the employee
was not supported by substantial evidence, the employer did
not reasonably believe the evidence to be true, or the employer
acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or for an illegal reason.9 The
court reasoned that allowing the employer to make a good
faith determination as to the existence of just cause strikes a
proper balance between the desire to protect employees from
arbitrary or improperly motivated termination decisions and
the desire not to unnecessarily infringe upon the employer's
prerogative of running his business as he sees fit.100
93. Id. at 135-36, 769 P.2d at 302-03.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
and Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 753 P.2d 517 (1988)).
96. Baldwin, 112 Wash. at 135-36, 769 P.2d at 302-03.
97. Id. at 136, 769 P.2d at 303.
98. Id. at 138-39, 769 P.2d at 304.
99. Id. at 139, 769 P.2d at 304.
100. Id. (citing Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276
(1982)).
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While some may criticize Baldwin on the ground that it
fails to accord the employer's promise any real value, the Bald-
win court's reasoning is analytically sound in light of Thomp-
son. If the employer has obligated himself to provide his
employees with "specific treatment in specific situations" with
regard to dismissals, then the employee can reasonably expect
only that the employer will do what he has promised. The lan-
guage in the handbook will often establish both grounds for
dismissal and procedures for effecting a termination. The
employer promises that he will take certain steps precipitating
a discharge only if it is determined that specific grounds are
found to exist. Where the employer follows those steps and
makes a good faith determination that results in a discharge,
he has kept his promise to the employee, even if that determi-
nation later turns out to be incorrect.
A rule allowing juries to second guess the employer's deci-
sion as to whether just cause for termination exists would not
only hold the employer to a standard of perfection, but would
also severely restrict the employer's ability to terminate
employees for legitimate reasons affecting the employer's busi-
ness. In practice, such a rule would allow the employee a sec-
ond chance to challenge his termination before a fact finder
who is likely to be more sympathetic and less familiar with the
actual conditions and practices of the workplace. As a result,
employers would feel secure in terminating an employee only
when the evidence in support of a just cause finding is so over-
whelming that even the most sympathetic jury would be likely
to uphold the employer's action. In the end, employers may
decide that the benefits of such a process are outweighed by
the risks involved.
On the other hand, protecting the employer's good faith
determination of adequate grounds for discharge will
encourage employers to conduct a thorough review of all
employee terminations since a failure to do so might be seen as
evidence of bad faith or improper motive. The increased atten-
tion given to termination proceedings should benefit both the
employer and its employees because both suffer when a pro-
ductive employee is terminated for reasons not connected to
the employee's ability or performance.
VI. LITIGATION AFTER THOMPSON
The Thompson decision had the potential to foster wide-
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spread litigation over statements in employee handbooks and
allow terminated at will employees to recover substantial
awards. Nevertheless, in Washington, claims for wrongful dis-
charge under the employee handbook theory have been rela-
tively rare compared to some jurisdictions and have met with
only limited success.1' 1 Under Thompson, a plaintiff normally
will not have difficulty showing that he stayed on the job and
did not seek other employment. A plaintiff can make such a
showing by simply testifying that he or she was satisfied with
the conditions of his or her employment, including the
employer's termination policies. The plaintiff may find it diffi-
cult, however, to show specific knowledge of the particular
handbook provision relied upon 10 2 or to convince the court that
the statements therein constituted a legal promise.x3 In addi-
tion, Washington appellate courts, for the most part, have not
looked favorably upon wrongful discharge claims, 4 and have
limited the reach of the Thompson holding.10 5 This tendency
101. See, e.g., Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Co., 111 Wash. 2d 609, 762 P.2d 1142
(1988); St. Yves v. Mid State Bank, 111 Wash. 2d 374, 757 P.2d 1384 (1988); Grimwood v.
University of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wash. 2d 355, 753 P.2d 517 (1988).
102. See Stewart, 111 Wash. 2d at 614-15, 762 P.2d at 1146; Grimwood, 110 Wash. 2d
at 366-67, 753 P.2d at 522-23.
103. See, e.g., Slaughter v. County Fire Protection Dist. No. 20, 50 Wash. App. 733,
750 P.2d 656 (1988); Armstrong v. The Richland Clinic, Inc., P.S., 42 Wash. App. 181,
709 P.2d 1237 (1985).
104. See St Yves, 111 Wash. 2d at 379, 757 P.2d at 1387.
105. See, e.g., McGuire v. State, 58 Wash. App. 195, 791 P.2d 929 (1990) in which
the court held that state administrative agencies lack the authority under state law to
modify an employee's at will status. Thus, any promise contained in an employee
handbook issued by a state agency is void, even if the promise would otherwise be
binding under Thompson.
The experience of wrongful discharge claimants in Washington is not unlike that
in many other states. See Note, At-Will Employment in Michigan Courts: Perception
and Reality, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 751 (1986); Note, The Case for Keeping Employment-
At-Wil" An Analysis of Ohio's Position and the Use of Disclaimers to Avoid
Wrongful Discharge Litigation, 16 CAP. U. L. REV. 723 (1987). See also, Nixon v.
Celotex Corp., 693 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (implied contract doctrine of
Toussaint does not apply to reduction in force layoff); Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. S. Ct. 1988) (handbook containing general statements of
self-imposed policies held insufficient to modify employee's at will status); Stratton v.
Chevrolet Motor Div., General Motors Corp., 229 Neb. 771, 428 N.W.2d 910 (1988)
(employer policies in handbook disseminated to employees did not modify contract of
employment); Towns v. Emery Air Freight, No. C-3-86-573 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (1988 WL
156258) (3 IER 911).
In one often cited case from Califonia, retrial of plaintiff's wrongful discharge
claim for breach of implied contract and covenant of good faith resulted in a jury
verdict for the employer. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (1981), trial after remand, 203 Cal. App. 3d 743, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1988).
In Michigan, cases following Toussaint have often construed the implied contract
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to limit the effect of Thompson may be attributable to a combi-
nation of two things: (1) a judicial reluctance to interfere with
the prerogatives of the employer when there is no clear show-
ing that the employer was motivated by some immoral or rep-
rehensible purpose, and (2) scepticism regarding the motives of
the employee in bringing an action against his or her former
employer.
On the other hand, plaintiffs' lack of success under
Thompson type claims in Washington may simply reflect an
absence of widespread abuse by employers of the power to ter-
minate their at will employees. In almost every Washington
case after Thompson, the employer has come forth with a plau-
sible, business-related explanation for the plaintiff's dis-
charge."o  In light of the ease with which employers are
exception to the at will rule narrowly. In Valentine v. General American Credit, 420
Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d 628 (1984), the court explained the Toussaint decision by stating
that it "did not recognize employment as a fundamental right or create a new 'special
right.' The only right held in Toussaint to be enforceable was the right that arose out
of the promise not to terminate except for cause." Id. at 258, 362 N.W.2d at 629. In
Lendi v. Quick Pik Food Stores, Inc., the Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted
Toussaint to allow modification of an employment contract during the course of the
employment relationship to effectively nullify an earlier representation to the
employee that her employment would continue as long as her performance was
satisfactory. 133 Mich. App. 583, 586-87, 349 N.W.2d 529 (1984).
This is not to say, however, that plaintiffs have never successfully asserted such
claims. In an Ohio case, Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 483 N.W.2d
150 (1985) a jury awarded a discharged employee $57,750.00 after the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the employer. Id. In a
recent Sixth Circuit case, Diggs v. Pepsi Cola, 861 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1988) the appeals
court applied Michigan law to uphold the bulk of a $217,774.00 judgment in favor of
the employee. The Diggs court noted that Toussaint had generally been given a
narrow construction, but it refused to overrule the district court's finding that a
promise of continued employment in the employer's performance appraisal system
endured so long as the employee's work was "satisfactory," created an implied
contractual right to be terminated only for just cause. Id.
At will employee plaintiffs have obtained similar awards in a number of
jurisdictions, including some in which the courts have embraced broader exceptions to
the at will rule. See Pratt v. Brown Machine Co., 855 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1988)
(upholding $62,000.00 jury award for economic damages for wrongful discharge claim
based upon employee handbook and an additional $60,000.00 in non-economic
damages); Ritchie v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 163 Mich. App. 358, 413 N.W. 2d
796 (upholding jury verdict for plaintiff but remanding for reconsideration of
defendant's request for remittitur of $560,000.00 future damages award); Stark v.
Circle K Corp., 230 Mont. 468, 751 P.2d 162 (upholding $200,000.00 award for breach of
contract of good faith and $70,000.00 punitive damages); Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co.,
39 Ohio App. 3d 99, 529 N.E.2d 958 (1988) (upholding award of $53,094.00 for implied
contract claim based upon employee handbook and a like amount for claim based upon
theory of promissory estoppel).
106. See, e.g., Swanson v. Liquid Air Corporation, 55 Wash. App. 917, 920, 781 P.2d
at 900, 902, remanded, 114 Wash. 2d 1008, 788 P.2d 531, aff'd after remand sub nom,
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apparently able to meet this burden of articulating a legitimate
reason for discharging an employee, a cynical view of Thomp-
son might be that it now stands for nothing more than that an
employer cannot discharge an at will employee unless the
employer can find or manufacture some legitimate reason for
its action. Such an assessment of Thompson would not be
entirely accurate, however, because the mere recital of a legiti-
mate business reason for terminating an employee will not
insulate the employer from liability. °7 Moreover, two recent
Washington cases appear to significantly broaden the scope of
the employee handbook exception as set forth in Thompson.
First, Brady v. Daily World,1'8 involved an employee who
the employer fired for alleged intoxication on the job. The
employee claimed reliance upon a provision in a personnel
handbook which stated that a decision to terminate an
employee would be made "only after careful consideration of
all known facts."'" After deciding that Thompson could be
applied retroactively to the plaintiff in Brady, whose appeal
from summary judgment had been stayed pending the outcome
of Thompson, the Washington Supreme Court determined that
the plaintiff had made a showing sufficient to avoid summary
judgment. The court held that whether any of the policies set
forth in the personnel manual amounted to promises of spe-
cific treatment in specific situations was a question of fact
which remained to be "proven."110 After reviewing the allega-
tions on both sides regarding Brady's conduct on and off the
job, the court easily concluded that a number of factual issues
existed as to whether the plaintiff had actually been intoxi-
cated on the job and whether that was the true reason for his
termination.""
The problem with the court's analysis in Brady is that the
Swanson v. LeDuc, No. 11540-9-I, 791 P.2d 257 (1990) (truck driver fired for fighting
on company premises); Hibbert v. Centennial Villas, Inc., 56 Wash. App. 889, 891-92,
786 P.2d at 309, 310 (nurse discharged for "carelessness and disregard for patient
safety")'; Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, 110 Wash. 2d 355, 357, 753 P.2d 517,
517-18 (food services director discharged for noncooperative behavior and failure to
complete certain mandatory tasks).
107. Articulating a legitimate reason for discharging the employee merely shifts
the burden of proof as to the actual reason back to the employee. See supra notes 89-
100 and accompanying text.
108. Brady v. Daily World, 105 Wash. 2d 770, 718 P.2d 785 (1986).
109. Id. at 772, 718 P.2d at 786. This handbook involved in the Brady case also
listed a number of grounds for dismissal, including intoxication or drug abuse.
110. Id. at 775, 718 P.2d at 788.
111. Id. at 776, 718 P.2d at 788.
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truth of the employer's reasons for discharging the employee is
only relevant where the employer has somehow limited his
right to terminate his at will employees. Absent such a limita-
tion, the employer would be free to discharge the employee for
any reason or no reason at all. Whether the employer has lim-
ited that right by making promises of specific treatment in spe-
cific situations should normally be a question of law unless
there is a dispute about what statements were made or the
context in which they were made."
Nevertheless, Brady remains the latest word from the
Washington Supreme Court on Thompson and was recently
followed by Division Three of the Court of Appeals in Adler v.
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.l" 3 In Adler, the court of appeals held
that, although statements made in an employee handbook did
not create any implied contract rights in the employee with
respect to termination, other evidence was sufficient to make
out a prima facie case of wrongful discharge, including evi-
dence of the employee's subjective understanding that termina-
tion would be for cause." 4 In spite of the apparent conflicts
between Adler and the supreme court's decisions in Thompson
and Roberts v. ARCO,"5 in which the court held that the plain-
tiff's subjective understanding that he would be terminated for
just cause only could not support a wrongful discharge claim,
the supreme court denied review of Adler."6
The Adler decision is especially troubling because it seems
to expand the scope of the implied contract exception for state-
ments made in employee handbooks beyond the context of the
handbook itself, or any other written statements distributed to
the employee. The court in Adler expressly found that the
statements made in the handbook did not constitute specific
promises sufficient to bind the employer, yet determined that
other circumstances, unrelated to the handbook or the
employee's understanding of its terms, raised a question of fact
as to whether the employee could be discharged for cause only.
Indeed, the court seemed to take as a given that the employee
had already established his right to continued employment
112. Messerly v. Asamera Minerals (U.S.), Inc., 55 Wash. App. 811, 816, 780 P.2d
1327, 1330 (1960). See also supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
113. 53 Wash. App. 33, 765 P.2d 910 (1988), review denied, 112 Wash. 2d 1013
(1989).
114. Id. at 37-38, 765 P.2d at 912.
115. 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977).
116. 112 Wash. 2d 1013 (1989).
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absent some cause for dismissal.1"7 One must wonder then,
whether the existence of a handbook or other writing is any
longer a prerequisite to an implied contract claim under
Thompson, or whether a simple allegation by the employee
that he understood that termination would be for cause only,
coupled with some evidence to support that understanding,
will now suffice.
VII. AvoIDING LIABILITY UNDER THOMPSON
The most effective way for an employer to avoid any possi-
bility of liability under Thompson's employee handbook excep-
tion is simply not to publish any type of handbook manual for
distribution to employees and/or removing those already in cir-
culation. Because many employers find distributing written
guidelines and statements of policy to their employees to be
valuable, such measures are too extreme. In addition, the
employee gains nothing if his employer takes such action.
Therefore, many employers will continue to publish and dis-
tribute employee handbooks so long as the perceived benefits
are not outweighed by the perceived risks.
The simplest and most effective way for an employer to
reduce the risk that statements in employee handbooks or
manuals will be construed as part of the employment contract
is to include in the handbook a disclaimer that no statements
therein should be regarded as binding upon the employer. The
handbook might also contain an explicit statement reaffirming
the at will status of the employee. The employer could also
include similar language in employment applications, assign-
ment of patent rights, or any other documents signed by the
employee relating to his employment status.118
Although the use of such disclaimers has been specifically
approved in Thompson,"9 disclaimers alone may not always be
effective. 20 Thus, the employer should remove any vague or
117. See Adler, 53 Wash. App. at 38, 765 P.2d at 912-13.
118. See M. Whitt and S. Goldman, Avoiding Liability in Employee Handbooks, 14
EmPL. REL. L.J. 5 (1988).
119. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 230, 685 P.2d 1081, 1088
(1984).
120. See, e.g., Morris v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 738 P.2d 841 (1987) (holding
that because a disclaimer contained in the company's handbook conflicted with other
language in the handbook and oral statements made to the employee, an issue of fact
was created as to whether the handbook was part of the contract of employment); see
also Aiello v. United Airlines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987) (disclaimers
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potentially misleading language which could inadvertently
affect the validity of a disclaimer from its employee handbooks
and any other documents distributed to its employees. 121
Supervisory personnel should be regularly instructed not to
make any verbal representations that could be viewed as modi-
fying the written terms of a handbook or other written state-
ment, and the handbook itself should contain a statement that
no representative of the company other than those persons or
bodies authorized to modify the company's employment poli-
cies may enter into any agreement contrary to the provisions
of the handbook.
In addition to the above precautions, the employer can fur-
ther limit his potential exposure by thoroughly documenting
the employer's relationship with each employee.'22 Docu-
menting the employee's initial hiring, performance history and
termination can serve several functions. First, in the absence
of documentation, any questions regarding the employee's per-
formance, the communication of any deficiencies to the
employee, or the real reason for the employee's termination
will be a matter of the employer's word against the employee's.
Thus, a question of fact arises which may have to be resolved
by a jury. Second, good documentation and communication
with the employee may prevent the discharged employee from
feeling compelled or, at least, justified in bringing an action
against the employer in the first place.
To be effective, documentation should be both accurate
and consistent. If it is not, it could have unintended conse-
quences. For example, if an employee is given good or ade-
quate performance ratings over a period of time when, his
performance was not in fact, satisfactory, the employer may
find it difficult to convince a jury that deficient performance
was the real reason for the employee's termination. Also,
when an employee is not given any specific explanation for his
discharge, both the employee and a potential jury are likely to
suspect an improper reason or motive. Thus, even though
doing so may be unpleasant, the employer should always be
prepared to inform the discharged employee of the precise rea-
attempting to disavow promises upon which employee could be expected to rely may
be ineffective).
121. See Coome, Employee Handbooks: Asset or Liability, 12 EMPL. REL. L.J. 4, 14
(1987).
122. See Keyes, Document Against Employee Suits, 34 PRACT. LAWYER No.4, 21
(1988).
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sons for the dismissal and to support those reasons with ade-
quate documentation. Following such recommendations will
by no means guarantee that an employer will never be sued for
wrongful discharge, but may decrease the likelihood that a dis-
pute will end up in court and may also increase the employer's
chances of successfully defending any such suit.123
Implementing some or all of the steps outlined above rep-
resents an added cost to the employer and may seem unneces-
sarily cumbersome. However, this added cost is not without
some benefit. Many of the steps set forth above are not only
useful to avoid lawsuits, but also help to maintain good
employer-employee relations. The employer will benefit in
terms of morale, productivity, and stability in the work force
from increased documentation and communication of the
employee termination process as well as other aspects of the
employee's work history, such as job performance evaluations.
The employer, however, is not the only one who benefits.
Greater attention to employee performance evaluations and
frank communication of the results to the employee allow the
employee to take corrective measures where appropriate.
Thorough and well documented procedures for termination
give an employee the opportunity to discover errors in the
decision making process, such as reliance on false or inaccurate
information, which can then be pointed out to the employer.
Also, clear and unequivocal statements in an employee hand-
book of the employer's lack of intent to modify the employee's
at will status will prevent employees from believing subjec-
tively that they have job security when they do not. The
employee can then make more informed decisions about stay-
ing on the job or seeking other employment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Five years after it was published, Thompson remains the
most significant statement to date by the Washington State
Supreme Court on the subject of at will employee rights. By
adopting two previously unrecognized exceptions to the at will
rule, the Court clearly signaled a departure from the rigid
application of the rule that had characterized previous deci-
sions. Subsequent decisions have shown that Thompson was
not a first step toward complete abandonment of the at will
123. Id.
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doctrine. On the contrary, the supreme court and lower courts
have tended to limit the reach of Thompson for the most part.
At other times, the Washington Supreme Court and several
court of appeals decisions have given Thompson a broader
application than the Thompson opinion itself would seem to
justify. This has created a certain amount of confusion, partic-
ularly in the area of implied contract rights arising from
employee handbooks.
In any event, the balance of rights between employers and
at will employees does not appear to have been radically
altered. As noted in Thompson itself, there already exists sig-
nificant state and federal statutory restrictions on the right of
employers to discharge at will employees, particularly minority
and elderly employees, who may be most at risk of unfair
termination.
Thompson provides at will employees with an additional
mechanism for seeking redress in the courts where the
employer's conduct in terminating the employee has been par-
ticularly egregious or otherwise manifestly unfair. So long as
Thompson is interpreted and applied with reference to estab-
lished principals of contract law, employers in Washington
should be able to make employee termination decisions based
upon legitimate business reasons without undue fear of litiga-
tion or liability.
Nevertheless, the threat of litigation under Thompson will
continue to cause employers to deal more cautiously with their
at will employees and to adopt safeguards against litigation.
Because many of those safeguards benefit both the employer
and the employee, the net effect of Thompson on the at will
employment relationship can be greater cooperation and com-
munication between employers and employees, rather than
greater division.
On the other hand, several recent cases indicate a possible
broadening of the scope of Thompson's implied contract theory
of liability. Any significant expansion of Thompson in that
regard could discourage open communication between employ-
ers and employees and undo whatever benefit Thompson has
achieved. That would be an unfortunate result. Some individ-
ual plaintiffs might benefit from an expansion of implied con-
tract liability under Thompson, but at will employees as a
whole would suffer from the resulting decreased communica-
tion between employee and employer.
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Someday, and perhaps soon, the Washington Supreme
Court may be compelled to resolve the questions raised by
Thompson and its progeny, particularly questions pertaining to
the effect of the employee handbooks. In doing so, the court
should be guided not only by considerations of fairness to dis-
charged employees, but also by the effect that its decisions are
likely to have on the at will employment relationship in gen-
eral. As noted in Thompson, it is the employer who defines
and retains independent control over the working relation-
ship. 2 4 Thus, whether a rule of liability for discharge of at
will employees will benefit those employees as a whole
depends to a great extent on how employers are likely to react
to it.
124. Thompson, 102 Wash. 2d at 229, 685 P.2d at 1087.
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